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Introduction
On August 17, 1999, an earthquake centered in Izmit, Turkey killed over
40,000 people. Most of the people killed were buriec in kayak buildings-
"contraband" buildings whose builders had bribed their way around Tur-
key's building codes.' A Turkish columnist concluded that "[clorruption
kills people, not earthquakes." 2
Four years earlier, in Seoul, South Korea, the Sampoong department
store collapsed, killing over three hundred and injuring over nine hundred
people.3 As with the kagak buildings, the builders of the Sampoong depart-
ment store paid bribes rather than meeting local building codes.4 The
* Associate Professor of Legal Studies, The Wharton School of the University of
Pennsylvania.
1. See Metin Munir, 'Corruption Kills People, Not Earthquakes,' FIN. TIMES, Aug. 19,
1999, at 2.
2. Id. at 2 (quoting an unnamed Turkish columnist).
3. See John Burton, S Korea Blames Lax Inspection, FIN. TIMEs, July 4, 1995, at 6
(discussing collapse of the Sampoong department store and connection to bribery).
4. See Robert Elegant, Removing the Veils from East Asian Corruption, INT'L HERALD
TRIB., Jan. 19, 1996, at I (reporting that twenty people were sent to jail in connection
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Sampoong department store's collapse capped three years of disasters
involving man-made constructions in Korea, in which over one thousand
lives and billions of dollars were lost due to the convergence of negligence,
inexperience, and corruption. 5
The corruption that resulted in these deaths involved local business-
persons bribing local officials. Corruption, however, is no more limited by
political boundaries than are business transactions, and a significant per-
centage of large bribes paid around the world are probably paid by persons
or companies that are not local. These bribes are no less harmful because
they are paid by non-local entities. Indeed, transnational bribery is as
lethal as any form of bribery, and its control is a subject worthy of study by
transnational scholars.
Any study of corruption must recognize two gaps. First, there is a gap
between the growing number of transnational communities and critical
institutions such as law formation and enforcement.6 Relationships, par-
ticularly commercial relationships, are now formed with little regard for
political borders. 7 At the same time, law continues to be generated prima-
rily by national bodies, and its effect often stops at the border.
The second gap is in academia itself. Although much speculation,
observation, and many anecdotes exist, little empirical analysis of corrup-
tion has been performed. The genesis, growth, and spread of endemic cor-
ruption, for example, remain largely unexplored. The effects of corruption,
however, have received scholarly attention, and economists and sociolo-
gists agree that corruption harms societies a great deal.
Those who labor under corrupt systems agree. For the most part, peo-
ple no longer tolerate corruption. Various groups have taken up tools to
combat corruption, including extraterritorial anti-bribery laws that
criminalize the payment of bribes to foreign government officials. Most
countries in the Western Hemisphere have agreed, through the Inter-Ameri-
can Convention Against Corruption,8 to criminalize transnational bribery.
The members of the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Develop-
ment (OECD) have also agreed, through the Convention on Combating
Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions
with the Sampoong department store collapse, including the seventy-two-year-old chair-
man of the store, his son, and the government official that they bribed).
5. See Steve Glain, Store Collapse in Seoul Underscores Need For Drastic Reform of
Building Industry, ASIAN WALL ST. J. WKLY., July 10, 1995, at 2.
6. See OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, MARKETs AND HIERARCHiEs: ANALYSIS AND ANTrRusT
IMPLICATIONS: A S=-uY IN ThE ECONOMICS OF INTamNAL ORGANIZATION at xi-xii (1975) (not-
ing that markets require institutions); Neil Fligstein, Markets as Politics: A Political-Cul-
tural Approach to Market Institutions, 61 Am. Soc. REv. 656, 656 (1996) (noting that
markets are inseparable from institutions).
7. See Stephen J. Kobrin, The Architecture of Globalization: State Sovereignty in a
Networked Global Economy, in GovERNMENTs, GLOBALIZATION, AND INTERNATIONAL Busl-
tN.ss 146, 148 (John H. Dunning ed., 1997) (stating that the world is experiencing deep
economic integration); Jessica T. Mathews, Power Shift, FOREIGN As'., Jan.-Feb. 1997, at
50, 50 (stating that globalization has lead to the creation of relationships with little
regard for national boundaries).
8. Mar. 26, 1996, 35 I.L.M. 724 [hereinafter IACC].
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(OECD Convention), 9 to criminalize the bribery of foreign officials. The
laws implementing these agreements have been criticized by a number of
scholars as unwarranted intrusions into the affairs of other countries.
This article reviews and rejects the claim that anti-bribery laws consti-
tute an intrusion thrust upon other countries. Section I looks at the nature
of transnational bribery itself. Section II briefly sketches the scope, moti-
vation, and content of current anti-bribery legislation and initiatives. Sec-
tion III discusses the arguments against extraterritorial anti-bribery laws
and evaluates the underlying premises of those arguments. Sections IV
and V present further criticisms of the argument that anti-bribery laws are
intrusive, noting that extraterritorial regulation of business conduct is
commonplace and that multiculturalism allows room for the values of all
parties.
I. Bribery
Bribery is universally condemned and is criminalized by every country in
the world.10 At the edges, legal definitions of bribery may differ. Saudi
Arabia, for example, holds a government official criminally liable if "he has
solicited for himself or a third party, or accepted or received a promise or
gift to perform any duties of his function or claims that such act falls
within the scope of his duties, even where the act is lawful." 1 Australian
law, on the other hand, states:
A person who, in order to influence or affect a Commonwealth officer in the
exercise of his duty or authority as a Commonwealth officer, gives or con-
fers, or promises to give or confer, any property or benefit of any kind to or
on the Commonwealth officer or any other person is guilty of [the offense of
bribery]. 12
Because statutory definitions of bribery differ, the global understand-
ing of bribery is more easily understood when bribery is discussed in gen-
eral rather than legal terms. 13 Bribery involves an improper payment made
in exchange for abuse or misuse of a government official's office. Joseph
Nye provides an authoritative definition-"behavior which deviates from
the formal duties of a public role because of private-regarding (personal,
close family, private clique) pecuniary or status gains; or violates rules
against the exercise of certain types of private-regarding influence."' 4
9. Dec. 18, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 1 [hereinafter OECD Convention].
10. See Fritz F. Heimann, Should Foreign Bribery Bc a Crime (Sept. 20, 1994) <http://
www.transparency.de/documents/source-book/c/cvl/i9.html>.
11. Combating Bribery Law, Official Gazette No. 3414, art. 1 (July 31, 1992) (Saudi
Arabia), reprinted in Saudi Arabia: Anti-Bribery Law, 9 ARaB L.Q. 283 (1994).
12. Crimes Act, 1914, sec. 73(3) (Austl.).
13. See Bryan W. Husted, Honor Among Thieves: A Transaction-Cost Interpretation of
Corruption in Third World Countries, 4 Bus. ETHics Q. 17, 18-19 (1994); see also FrankJ.
Sorauf, Politics, Experience, and the First Amendment: The Case of American Campaign
Finance, 94 COLUM. L. REv. 1348, 1350 (1994) (stating that "'quid pro quo'.. is ... the
vital element of any definition of bribery").
14. J.S. Nye, Corruption and Political Development: A Cost-Benefit Analysis, 61 Am.
POL. Sci. REv. 417, 419 (1967). A contemporary echoed Nye's definition, defining cor-
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An important corollary springs from this general concept of bribery:
the behaviors that constitute improper payments and abuse or misuse of
office are defined locally. For example, if a tip to a government official is
allowed in a given country, then that tip is not an improper payment.
15
Similarly, if a government official legally may give preference to her rela-
tives, then such preferential treatment does not constitute abuse of office.
16
Bribery is morally repugnant to the major religions and schools of
moral thought.17 One should not confuse mala in se, however, with mala
prohibita. Bribery is controlled because it is commercially damaging and
socially corrosive. Bribery kills, and bribery destroys.
The economic and social damage caused by bribery has been expli-
cated at great length elsewhere; 18 those discussions will not be repeated in
rupt activity as the "misuse of authority as a result of considerations of personal gain,
which need not be monetary." David H. Bayley, The Effects of Corruption in a Developing
Nation, 19 W. POL. Q. 719, 720 (1966).
15. This example, of course, is purely hypothetical, as the author knows of no coun-
try in which tipping government officials is legal. But see United States v. McNeive, 536
F.2d 1245, 1250-51 (8th Cir. 1976) (holding that an officeholder who received tips that
did not interfere with his discretionary duties fell outside the mail fraud statutes). For a
general discussion of the distinctions among tips, bribes, gifts, and prices, see SUSAN
ROsE-AcKERmAN, CORRUPTION AND GovERNmTrr: CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES, AND REFORM 91-
110 (1999).
16. This example also is purely hypothetical. Nepotism is generally considered a
basic form of corruption. See Robert Klitgaard, International Cooperation Against Cor-
ruption, FIN. & DEv., Mar. 1998, at 3, 4 (including nepotism among basic forms of cor-
ruption); Tarn Vanhanen, Domestic Ethnic Conflict and Ethnic Nepotism: A Comparative
Analysis, 36 J. PEACE RES. 55, 56 (1999) (describing nepotism). Nepotism, like bribery,
has resulted in investigation and resignation of government officials. See Andrew Mac-
Mullen, Fraud, Mismanagement and Nepotism: The Committee of Independent Experts and
the Fall of the European Commission 1999, 31 CIME, L. & Soc. CHANGE 193, 193 (1999)
(describing the resignation of all members of the Commission of the European Commu-
nities after an investigation conducted by a Committee of Independent Experts that
uncovered evidence of fraud, mismanagement, and nepotism).
17. See Philip M. Nichols, Outlawing Transnational Bribery Through the World Trade
Organization, 28 LAw & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 305, 321-22 (1997) (citing primary sources
from Buddhism, Christianity, Confucianism, Hinduism, Islam, Judaism, Sikhism, and
Taoism and philosophers that condemn bribery).
18. For discussion of the economic and social damage caused by bribery, see Pov-
ERTY REDUCTION AND ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT, WORLD BANK, HELPING COUNTRIES COMBAT
CORRUPTION: THE ROLE OF THE WORLD BANK 5 (1997) (discussing bribery's long-term
economic costs and much greater damage to political legitimacy and fairness); Frederick
M. Abbott, Foundation-Building for Western Hemispheric Integration, 17 Nw. J. INT'L L. &
Bus. 900, 914 (1996-97) (discussing the advantages of bribery to "inefficient local oper-
ators over efficient multinational operators"); Konyin Ajayi, On the Trail of a Spectre-
Destabilisation of Developing and Transitional Economies: A Case Study of Corruption in
Nigeria, 15 DICK. J. INT'L L. 545, passim (1997) (discussing corruption's role in the col-
lapse of the Nigerian economy); M.S. Alam, A Theory of Limits on Corruption and Some
Applications, 48 KYKLOS: INT'L REv. FOR SOC. ScI. 419, 431 (1995) (noting that
resources are diverted and wasted to hide illicit activities); Edgardo Buscaglia & Maria
Dakolias, An Analysis of the Causes of Corruption in the Judiciary, 30 LAw & PoL'Y INT'L
BUS. 95, 112 (Supp. 1999) (noting that "present corruption decreases future productiv-
ity, thereby reducing dynamic efficiency"); Maria Dakolias & Kim Thachuk, Attacking
Corruption in the Judiciary: A Critical Process in Judicial Reform, 18 Wis. INT'L J. 353,
358 (2000) (discussing the effect of corruption on judiciaries); Franklin A. Gevurtz,
Commercial Bribery and the Sherman Act: The Case for Per Se Illegality, 42 U. MtMI L.
Vol. 33
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this short article. Briefly, bribery distorts economies by affecting the deci-
sion-making process of both producers and government officials who pro-
cure goods and services. 19 A corrupt system does not reward the producer
of the best and cheapest product, but instead rewards the producer who
pays the largest bribe; the rational producer, therefore, will shift resources
away from quality and toward the bribe payment.20 Bribery also affects
procurement decisions, which, rather than being made on the basis of
price and quality, are made on the basis of personal gain.21
Bribery also reduces the amount of foreign investment and economic
growth in a country. 22 Empirical stdies by Paolo Mauro have demon-
REv. 365, 390 (1987) (noting the inefficiencies created when firms bribe to create
monopolies); Joseph Onek, Remarks: Roundtable on Global Corruption, 31 LAw & PoL'Y
INT'L Bus. 205, 205 (1999) (noting that corruption played a major role in the collapse of
Indonesia); Salim Rashid, Public Utilities in Egalitarian LDC's: The Role of Bribery in
Achieving Pareto Efficiency, 34 KYKLOS: lrr'L REV. FOR SOC. Sci. 448, 448-55 (1981)
(discussing the observation in an empirical study that over time bureaucrats expected
bribes and created inefficiencies to extract more and larger bribes); Ibrahim F.I. Shihata,
Corruption-A General Review With an Emphasis on the Role of the World Bank, 15 DICK.J.
INT'L L. 451, 454 (1997) (describing the literature that finds corruption to be harmful);
Francisco E. Thoumi, Some Implications of the Growth of the Underground Economy in
Columbia, 29J. INrERAMERICAN STUD. & WORLD AFF. 35, 44 (1987) (stating that over time
an honest individual in a corrupt system adapts and becomes more dishonest); Robert
Wade, The Market for Public Office: Why the Indian State is Not Better at Development, 13
WORLD DEv. 467, 474-80 (1985) (describing the sale of public offices by corrupt offi-
cials and the effect of corruption on a bureaucracy); infra notes 19-29.
19. For excellent, and longer, discussions of the distortion caused by corruption, see
SUSAN RosE-AcKERMAN, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF CORRUPTION-CAusES AND CONSE-
QUENCES 3-4 (World Bank Viewpoint No. 74, 1996); Vito Tanzi, Corruption, Governmen-
tal Activities, and Markets, FIN. & DEv., Dec. 1995, at 24, 25-26.
20. See M. Shahid Alam, Anatomy of Corruption: An Approach to the Political Econ-
omy of Underdevelopment, 48 Am. J. EcON. & Soc. 441,449-50 (1989) (noting that not
only is the quality of goods disregarded, but also that producers who cheat on the qual-
ity of goods to pay larger bribes will be successful); see also Stanley Sporkin, The World-
wide Banning of Schmiergeld: A Look at the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act on its Twentieth
Birthday, 18 Nw. J. Ir'L L. & Bus. 269, 280 (1998) (describing low quality of construc-
tion due to corruption).
21. See Mark B. Bader & Bill Shaw, Amendment of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act,
15 N.Y.U. J. Ir'L L. & POL. 627, 627 (1983) ("A fundamental tenet of a free market
system is that economic transactions should be based solely upon the price and quality
of a product and the service provided by the seller."); Daniel Pines, Comment, Amending
the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act to Include a Private Right of Action, 82 CAL. L. REv. 185,
213 (1994) ("Bribery sabotages the free market system .... ").
Corruption distorts economies in other, more subtle ways. The diversion of large
sums of money into the black hole of corruption, for example, distorts relative prices.
See Omotunde E. G. Johnson, An Economic Analysis of Corrupt Government, With Special
Application to Less Developed Countries, 28 KYKLOS: INT'L REv. FOR Soc. Scl. 47, 55
(1975) (describing the distortion). The diversion of time and resources to maintaining
the secrecy of corrupt transactions also causes distortion. See Andrei Shleifer & Robert
W. Vishny, Corruption, 108 Q.J. ECON. 599, 611-15 (1993) (discussing distortion caused
by secrecy).
22. A great deal of evidence suggests a positive relationship between foreign invest-
ment and economic growth. See Ray Barrell & Nigel Pain, Foreign Direct Investment,
Technological Change, and Economic Growth Within Europe, 107 ECON. J. 1770, 1777-82,
178485 (1997) (finding that foreign direct investments play vital roles in the accelera-
tion of technological change and economic growth in European countries); Glenn
Firebaugh, Growth Effects of Foreign and Domestic Investment, 98 Am. J. Soc. 105, 105
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strated a "negative association between corruption and investment, as well
as growth, [that] is significant in both a statistical and an economic
sense."23 Similarly, Shang-Jin Wei found that corruption has a far greater
negative effect on foreign investment and growth than does taxation. 24
Bribery corrodes society. Citizens who live with corrupted bureaucra-
cies tend to mistrust government. 25 They have good reason: honest offi-
cials tend to leave corrupted bureaucracies, 26 and those who remain often
purposefully create uncertainty so that they may extract bribes. 27 Govern-
(1992) (finding a beneficial relationship between foreign investment and growth). The
evidence, however, is mixed. See Amitava Krishna Dutt, The Pattern of Direct Foreign
Investment and Economic Growth, 25 WORLD DEv. 1925, 1934 (1997) (finding that differ-
ent patterns of foreign investment affect growth in host countries differently); Jeffrey
Kentor, The Long-Term Effects of Foreign Investment Dependence on Economic Growth,
1940-1990, 103 Am.J. Soc. 1024, 1024-27 (1998) (describing debate between those who
hold that dependence of a national economy on foreign investment promotes economic
growth and those who hold that it causes underdevelopment). This article does not
purport to offer a definitive statement with respect to the issue; for more discussion of
economic growth, see infra notes 44-47 and accompanying text.
23. Paolo Mauro, Corruption and Growth, 110 QJ. ECON. 681, 705 (1995); see also
Paolo Mauro, The Effects of Corruption on Growth, Investment, and Government Expendi-
ture: A Cross-Country Analysis, in CORRUPTION AND THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 83, 91
(Kimberly Ann Elliott ed., 1997) (finding that a measurable decrease in a country's cor-
ruption would increase its investment to gross domestic product ratio by over four per-
cent and the annual growth in gross domestic product per capita by almost half a
percent). Edgardo Campos and others find that while the negative effect is lessened if a
corrupt government is predictable, there is still a negative effect. J. Edgardo Campos et
al., The Impact of Corruption on Investment: Predictability Matters, 27 WORLD Day. 1059,
1065 (1999).
24. See SHANG-JIN WEI, WHY IS CORRUPTION SO MUCH MORE TAXING THAN TAX? ARBI-
TRA iNEss KILLS 14-15 (National Bureau of Econ. Research Working Paper No. 6255,
1997); SANi,-JIN WEI, How TAXING IS CORRUPTION ON INTERNATIONAL INVESTORS? 24
(National Bureau of Econ. Research Working Paper No. 6030, 1997) (finding that an
increase in the level of corruption decreases the amount of foreign investment).
25. See A.W. Cragg, Business, Globalization, and the Logic and Ethics of Corruption,
53 Irr'LJ. 643, 654 (1998) (noting that respect for law and institutions is a "casualty" of
bribery); Herbert H. Werlin, The Consequences of Corruption: The Ghanaian Experience,
88 POL. Sci. Q. 71, 79 (1973) ("The effect of corruption is to generate an atmosphere of
distrust which pervades all levels of administration.").
26. See Johnson, supra note 21, at 57 (noting that potential government employees
will avoid government work for moral reasons when corruption is pervasive). Con-
versely, Vito Tanzi notes that "[slome individuals will try to get jobs not in the areas in
which they might use their particular ability for productive use but in areas that provide
scope for taking advantage of their special positions." Tanzi, supra note 19, at 26. Cragg
notes that, ironically, the payment of bribes also corrupts the decision-making ability of
bribe-paying companies by, among other things, creating an environment in which
employees think that it is appropriate to put their own interests ahead of the company's.
See Cragg, supra note 25, at 653.
27. See Alam, supra note 20, at 449 (stating that "bribery may impose costs because
of the official's efforts to maximize the offer of bribes" by creating false uncertainties).
In his outstanding study of the Irrigation Department of a state in southern India, Rob-
ert Wade found that officials actively created uncertainty among farmers to generate
larger bribes and that the Irrigation Department, as a consequence, had lost its credibil-
ity with the farmers. See Robert Wade, The System of Administrative and Political Corrup-
tion: Canal Irrigation in South India, 18 J. Day. STUD. 287, 314-15 (1982).
Vol. 33
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ments become unable to effect programs for the general good.28 Ulti-
mately, bribery "undermines the legitimacy of governments, especially
democracies. Citizens may come to believe that the government is simply
for sale to the highest bidder .... It can lead to coups by undemocratic
leaders."29
Bribery, then, consists of the abuse or misuse of public office in
exchange for personal gain; misuse or abuse of office is locally defined.
Bribery is universally condemned and can cause severe economic and
social damage. There is little wonder, therefore, that people attempt to con-
trol this practice through, among other methods, anti-bribery laws that
criminalize transnational bribery.
II. Anti-Bribery Laws
As many have noted, numerous transnational initiatives currently attempt
to curtail the harmful practice of bribery.30 These initiatives spring from
governments, nongovernmental organizations,31 grassroots movements, 32
28. Tanzi notes: "When civil servants appropriate, for their own use, the instruments
that the government has at its disposal to influence the economy and to correct the
shortcomings of the private market, they reduce the power of the state and its ability to
play its intended, and presumably corrective, role." Tanzi, supra note 19, at 26; see also
Manash Ranjan Gupta & Sarbajit Chaudhuri, Formal Credit, Corruption and the Informal
Credit Market in Agriculture: A Theoretical Analysis, 64 ECONoMicA 331 (1997) (connect-
ing the bribe rate for farmers to receive loans from public officials to the informal inter-
est rates set by loansharks).
29. Susan Rose-Ackerman, The Political Economy of Corruption, in CORmUTION AND
THE GLOBAL ECONOMY, supra note 23, at 31, 45 (citations omitted); see also Nancy Zucker
Boswell, Combating Corruption: Focus on Latin America, 3 Sw. J.L. & TRADE Am. 179, 180
(1996) (stating that bribery undermines democracy); John Brademas & Fritz Heimann,
Tackling International Corruption: No Longer Taboo, 77 FOREIGN AF'., Sept.-Oct. 1998, at
17, 18 (describing damage done by bribery scandals to governments in Brazil, Colom-
bia, Ecuador, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Mexico, NATO, Pakistan, South Korea, Vene-
zuela, and Zaire).
30. See generally Barbara Crutchfield George & Kathleen Lacey, A Coalition of Indus-
trialized Nations, Developing Nations, Multilaterial Development Banks, and Non-Govern-
mental Organizations: A Pivotal Complement to Current Anti-Corruption Initiatives, 33
CORNELL INTl' LJ. 547 (2000).
31. The International Chamber of Commerce, for example, is a nongovernmental
"association of internationally-oriented enterprises and their national organizations"
that works to "'promote international commerce worldwide."' W. LAURENcE CRAIG Er
AL., INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE ARBITRATION 25 (2d ed. 1990). Founded in
1919, the International Chamber of Commerce has over 7000 members. See id. In
1996, the International Chamber of Commerce adopted the Rules of Conduct to Combat
Extortion and Bribery, which prohibits the offer or acceptance of any bribe or kickback,
requires companies to control payments by their agents, and requires recordkeeping suf-
ficient to prevent the hiding of illicit payments or secret funds. See International Cham-
ber of Com., Extortion and Bribery in International Business Transactions, arts. 1 ("No
one may, directly or indirectly, demand or accept a bribe."), 2 ("No enterprise may,
directly or indirectly, offer or give a bribe and any demands for such a bribe must be
rejected."), 4 (imposing financial recording and auditing requirements on enterprises)
(visited Sept. 24, 2000) <http://www.iccwbo.org/home/statementsrules/rules/1999/
briberydoc99.asp>. Although the Chamber urged its members to adopt these rules, they
are intended as a voluntary code of corporate conduct and are not intended to be
adopted in any formal way by any government. See id.
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and intergovernmental organizations 33 and span the globe,34 discrete
regions,35 countries,36 and even cities.37 Indeed, it "is difficult to think of
a significant international organisation not looking at corruption."38
These initiatives utilize a number of tools to combat corruption.39 The
most often utilized, and even more frequently supported,40 tool is the
32. See, e.g., Community Info. and Epidemiological Tech., CIET International: Build-
ing the Community Voice into Planning (visited Sept. 28, 2000) <http://www.ciet.org>.
CIET is an international group of non-profit, non-governmental organizations,
academic institutes, charities, foundations and trusts dedicated to building the
community voice into planning and good governance. CIET is also an interna-
tional group of professionals from a variety of disciplines, including epidemiol-
ogy, medicine, law, planning, communications and other social sciences, who
bring scientific research methods to community level. By involving people at
the community level in information gathering and analysis, CIET helps them to
participate, in an increasingly informed way, in decisions that affect their lives.
Id.
33. The Customs Co-Operation Council of the World Customs Organization, for
example, adopted the Arusha Declaration, which acknowledges that "corruption can
destroy the efficient functioning of any society and diminish the ability of the Customs
to accomplish its mission." World Customs Organization, Arusha Declaration (July 7,
1993) <http://www.wcoomd.org/hrds/Arusha4e.pdf>. The Declaration sets forth a
"Customs integrity programme" that suggests, inter alia, that Customs adopt simple pro-
cedures, move staff frequently, and employ external audits. See id. paras. 2, 4, 6.
34. See infra notes 42-43 and accompanying text (discussing the efforts of the
United Nations).
35. See Charles Manga Fombad, Curbing Corruption in Africa: Some Lessons from Bot-
swana's Experience, 160 INT'L Soc. Sci. J. 241, 241-42 (1999) (describing many move-
ments to decrease corruption in Africa); Global Coalition for Mr., Corruption (Feb. 26,
1999) <http://www.gca-cma.org/ecorrup.htm> (describing the anti-corruption frame-
work of the Global Coalition for Africa).
36. See OFFICE OF THE PRIME MINISTER, KOREA'S ANmi-CORRUPTrON PROGRAMS 15-26
(1999) (describing South Korea's country-wide anti-corruption program).
37. See Goh Kun, Mayor of Seoul, A Systematic Approach to Anti-Corruption: The
Case of the Seoul Metropolitan Government, Address at the 9th International Anti-Cor-
ruption Conference (Oct. 14, 1999) (transcript available in <http://
www.metro.seoul.kr/eng/smg/mayor/speech/speechidurban.html>) (describing the
anti-corruption program of Seoul, South Korea).
38. Martin Wolf, Corruption in the Spotlight, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 16, 1997, at 23; see
Alan Doig, Dealing with Corruption: The Next Steps, 29 CRIME, L. & Soc. CHANGE 99, 100
(1998) ("International agencies and donors governments have all issued statements or
policies on corruption.").
39. See Robert S. Leiken, Controlling the Global Corruption Epidemic, FOREIGN POL'Y,
Dec. 1996, at 55, 68 (suggesting "[d]eregulation, decentralization, and the simplification
of government procedures-fortified by transparent bidding systems, the rotation of
offices, and modern information-management systems" and "market reforms that dis-
solve state monopolies and trim the discretionary power of officials"). Actual programs
describe more specific measures. The anti-corruption program in Seoul, South Korea,
for example, includes deregulation, means of reporting corruption, streamlined online
applications, joint inspections with citizens, a citizen ombudsman, and a "zero toler-
ance" policy toward corruption. Kun, supra note 37 (describing the program).
40. On February 24, 1999, Vice President Al Gore convened a forum of international
leaders to discuss corruption. See FINAL CONFERENCE REPORT: A GLOBAL FORUM ON FIGHT-
ING CORRUPTION at iii (1999) [hereinafter FINAL REPORT]. A number of leaders and schol-
ars from emerging and developing countries expressed support for, or even demanded,
the criminalization of transnational bribery by wealthier countries. See FINAL REPORT,
supra, at 19 (statement of Jorge Fernando Quiroga Ramirez, Vice President of Bolivia)
("[Ilt [is] important that countries not tolerate abroad what they would not tolerate at
2000 The Myth of Anti-Bribery Laws
criminalization of transnational bribery.4 1 This section examines some of
the multinational regimes for the criminalization of transnational bribery,
the reasons for the creation of these regimes, and the definitions of bribery
in implementing legislation.
A. Multilateral Initiatives
At the broadest level, several international bodies have taken up the issue
of corruption and bribery. The United Nations adopted in 1996 a Declara-
tion against Corruption and Bribery in International Commercial Transac-
tions,4 2 which calls upon members of the United Nations to criminalize
transnational bribery.43 The President of the World Bank has stated that
no issue is more important to his organization than corruption,4 4 and the
Bank has published procurement guidelines, banned bribe-giving contrac-
tors from further work on Bank-funded projects, and threatened to cancel
home."), 19 (statement of Carlos Rukhauf, Vice President of Argentina) (supporting the
OECD Convention), 22 (statement ofJaime David Fernandez Mirabel, Vice President of
the Dominican Republic) (asking "all Western Hemisphere countries that had not done
so to ratify the Inter-American Convention Against Corruption"), 35 (statement of Luis
Alfonso Davila, President of Congress, Venezuela) (stating that the fight against corrup-
tion requires the will of neighboring countries), 60 (statement of Vasyl Durdynets, Direc-
tor of the National Bureau of Investigation of Ukraine) ("Ukraine supports enhanced
international cooperation to jointly seek ways and legal frameworks to act against cor-
ruption. .. ."), 73 (statement of Dr. Anton Bebler, Professor of Sociology at the Univer-
sity of Ljubljana, Slovenia) (recommending movement toward "[c]ompleting and
strengthening the regime of international conventions against corruption"); OFFICE OF
THE PRIME MINrTER, supra note 36, at 11 (listing as a task for Korea the strengthening of
ties with international organizations and other countries "for the purpose of combating
corruption both domestically and globally"); Global Coalition for Mr., supra note 35
(welcoming the actions of the OECD and the International Chamber of Commerce, but
asking that donor countries "do more to investigate corrupt practices and punish those
engaged in them"); Festus Mogae, President of the Republic of Botswana, Corruption
and the North-South Dilemma, Opening Remarks at the 9th International Anti-Corrup-
tion Conference (Oct. 11, 1999) (transcript available in <http://www.transparency.de/
iacc/9th.papers/dayl/plenary/dlpltmbeki.html>) (condemning "voluntary and
weaker codes of conduct" and demanding criminalization of transnational bribery).
41. See Cragg, supra note 25, at 659 (stating that "the criminalization of corruption
within national boundaries must be extended to include international business transac-
tions"); Leiken, supra note 39, at 71 (stating that "the solution to transnational bribery
lies not in a futile attempt to repeal the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act but in universal-
izing it").
42. G.A. Res. 51/191, U.N. GAOR, 51st Sess., Annex, Agenda Item 12, U.N. Doc. A/
RES/51/191 (1996) [hereinafter U.N. Declaration]. In 1998, the United Nations
renewed the call for members to implement the Declaration's provisions. See Action
Against Corruption and Bribery in International Commercial Transactions, G.A. Res. 53/
176, U.N. GAOR, 53d Sess., 91st plen. mtg. 1 4, U.N. Doc. A/RES/53/176 (1998).
These resolutions build on a 1976 resolution condemning transnational bribery and
requesting unilateral and multilateral action. See U.N. Declaration, supra, at 1; Action
Against Corruption and Bribery in International Commercial Transactions, supra, at 1.
43. See U.N. Declaration, supra note 42, 1 2.
44. Statement ofJames Wolfensohn, President of the World Bank, Address at the 9th
International Anti-Corruption Conference (Oct. 11, 1999) (transcript available in
<http://www.transparency.de/iacc/9thJacc/papers/dayl/plenary/
dlpl-jwolfensohn.html>).
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loans to bribe-soliciting countries. 45 The International Monetary Fund
instructs its advisors to take a proactive role in dealing with corruption and
will take action, including withdrawal of Fund support, in the event of cor-
ruption.4 6 Even the World Trade Organization has established a Working
Group on Transparency in Government Procurement (Working Group). 4 7
At the global level, therefore, criminalization of transnational bribery is a
suggested, but not required part of a comprehensive attack on corruption.
At the regional level, however, criminalization of transnational bribery
is required by at least two organizations. The Organization of American
States promulgated in 1996 a treaty that requires its members to take cer-
tain actions with respect to transnational bribery, including criminalizing
45. See Helmut Sohmen, Critical Importance of Controlling Corruption, 33 INT'L LAW.
863, 865 (1999) (discussing activity of the World Bank). Section 1.15 of the Guidelines
for Procurement Under IBRD Loans and IDA Credits states that any firm that offers or
gives or receives or solicits a bribe will be ineligible for Bank-financed contracts; at least
forty firms have been declared ineligible. See World Bank, Listing of Debarred Firms (last
modified Feb. 29, 2000) <http://www.worldbank.org/html/opr/procure/debarr.html>
(stating relevant guidelines and providing a current list of ineligible firms). Section 1.25
of the Guidelines for the Selection and Employment of Consultants under IBRD Loans and
IDA Credits states that any consultant that offers or gives or receives or solicits a bribe
may be ineligible for future Bank-funded work; at least six consultant firms have been
declared ineligible. See id. (providing a current list of ineligible consultants).
46. See INTENATIONAL MONETARY FUND, GOOD GovERNAacrr: THE IMF's ROLE 2
(1997) (describing the Fund's more proactive role and stating that the Fund will not
support corrupt governments); see also Sohmen, supra note 45, at 866 (stating that the
Fund now limits its involvement in countries where corruption negatively affects domes-
tic economic growth). Section 1.2.2 of the Fund's Code of Good Practices on Fiscal Trans-
parency- Declaration of Principles states that "It]axes, duties, fees, and charges should
have an explicit legal basis," while section 1.2.3 states that "[e]thical standards of behav-
ior for public servants should be clear and well-publicized." International Monetary
Fund, Code of Good Practices on Fiscal Transparency- Declaration of Principles (last modi-
fied Apr. 26, 1999) <http://www.imf.org/external/np/fad/trans/code.htm>. The code,
in section 4.1.1, also suggests that a "national audit body, or equivalent organization,
should be appointed by the legislature, with the responsibility to provide timely reports
to the legislature and public on the financial integrity of government accounts." Id.
47. See Ministerial Conference, Singapore Ministerial Declaration, WT/MIN(96)/
DEC '121, at 7 (Dec. 13, 1996) (creating the Working Group). Even this level of commit-
ment is surprising, given the dogged insistence by some members that corruption is not
an appropriate issue. See Nichols, supra note 17, at 364-77 (discussing objections made
by developing countries and emerging and mature economies). See generally Philip M.
Nichols, Corruption in the World Trade Organization: Discerning the Limits of the World
Trade Organization's Authority, 28 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 711 (1996) (exploring the
authority of the World Trade Organization to deal with the issue of corruption). The
ambivalence of the members is reflected in a report of the Working Group, expressing
the membership's commitment to combating corruption and bribery, but also discuss-
ing some members' views that the World Trade Organization's role should be limited to
transparency in government procurement without explicit mention of fighting corrup-
tion and bribery. See Working Group, Report (1999) to the General Council, WT/
WGTGP/3 11 111-15, at 36-37 (Oct. 12, 1999). The Working Group is considering
Draft Text for an Agreement on Transparency in Government Procurement, which consoli-
dates four different drafts circulated by Hungary, South Korea, Singapore, and the
United States. See General Council, Preparation for the 1999 Ministerial Conference: The
WTO's Contribution to Transparency in Government Procurement: Communication from
Hungary, Korea, Singapore and the United States, WT/GC/W/385, WT/WGTGP/W/27,
Annex, at 3-9 (Nov. 9, 1999).
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bribery of foreign officials. 4 8 The treaty further requires signatories to
allow extradition of bribe givers4 9 and bribe-taking officials and contains a
pledge that signatories will not invoke bank secrecy laws to impede investi-
gations into corruption.50 The treaty also requires signatories to criminal-
ize a government official's possession or acquisition of assets that the
official "cannot reasonably explain in relation to his lawful earnings dur-
ing the performance of his functions."5 1 Twenty-six members of the Organ-
ization have signed the treaty.5 2 The European Union has also agreed
upon a treaty that requires its members to criminalize transnational brib-
ery.5 3 This treaty, however, is far less extensive than the Organization of
American States' treaty in that it only requires members to criminalize
bribery involving officials of European Union countries.5 4
The most far-reaching international effort is the treaty among the
twenty-nine OECD members and five non-members5 5 requiring those
48. See IACC, supra note 8, arts. V-VI, 35 I.L.M. at 729; see also Lucinda A. Low et al.,
The Inter-American Convention Against Corruption: A Comparison With the United States
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 38 VA. J. IN'L L. 243, 247-249 (1998) (discussing the
requirement); RexJ. Zedalis, Internationalizing Prohibitions on Foreign Corrupt Practices:
The OA S Convention and the OECD Revised Recommendation, 31 J. WORLD TRADE No. 6,
Dec. 1997, at 45, 52-55 (discussing the treaty).
49. See IACC, supra note 8, art. XIII, 35 I.L.M. at 731 (dealing with extradition). The
extradition provision is particularly important in Latin America, which has a strong
tradition of providing asylum to government officials from other countries. See Ranee K.
L. Panjabi, Terror at the Emperor's Birthday Party: An Analysis of the Hostage-Taking Inci-
dent at the Japanese Embassy in Lima, Peru, 16 DicK. J. INT'L L. 1, 64 (1997) (noting that
the idea of asylum is strongest in Latin America). Indeed, a study concluded several
decades ago found that leaders seeking asylum in Latin American countries were never
extradited. See Otto Kirchheimer, Asylum, 53 AM. PoL. Sci. REv. 985, 1001-05 (1959).
50. See IACC, supra note 8, art. XVI, 35 I.L.M. at 732 (dealing with bank secrecy
laws); Low et al., supra note 48, at 254 (remarking that the bank secrecy provision is
"potentially very important").
51. See IACC, supra note 8, art. IX, 35 I.L.M. at 730 (dealing with illicit enrichment).
Illicit enrichment provisions exist in other anti-corruption legislation. See, e.g., C.I.S.
Part 11 (1989), Prevention of Corruption Act, 11, 9 Sept. 1988 (India).
52. The Convention has been signed by Argentina, the Bahamas, Bolivia, Brazil,
Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador,
Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay,
Peru, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, the United States, Uruguay, and Venezuela. See
Department of Legal Cooperation and Info., Organization of Am. States, B-58: Inter-
American Convention Against Corruption (last modified Oct. 8, 2000) <http://
www.oas.org/juridico/english/sigs/b-58.html>.
53. See Convention on the Fight Against Corruption Involving Officials of the Euro-
pean Union Communities or Officials of Member States of the European Union, 1997
Oj. (C 195) 2-11; David A. Gantz, Globalizing Sanctions Against Foreign Bribery: The
Emergence of a New International Legal Consensus, 18 Nw.J. INf'L L. & Bus. 457, 472-73
(1998) (discussing the European Union's convention).
54. See Gantz, supra note 53, at 472. For most members of the European Union,
therefore, this convention is superceded by the OECD Convention. See infra notes 55-59
and accompanying text.
55. The twenty-nine members are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, the Czech
Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy,
Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Por-
tugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
See Ayesha Qayyum, New Anti-Bribery Treaty Analyzed, INT'L CoM. LrG., Mar. 1998, at
Cornell International Law Journal
countries to criminalize transnational bribery.5 6 Penalties for the transna-
tional bribes must be proportionate to the penalties for domestic bribery.57
Signatories are required to assist one another in the investigation of bribery
and to allow extradition of bribe givers. 58 Unlike the United Nations' Dec-
laration and Organization of American States' Convention-important in
their own rights, the OECD Convention has caused tangible change in the
world's legal terrain. At least twenty-three countries to date have passed
legislation criminalizing transnational bribery: Australia, Austria, Belgium,
Bulgaria, Canada, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Ger-
many, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Japan, Korea, Mexico, Norway, the Slovak
Republic, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United
States.59 Legislation is pending in most of the remaining eleven countries.
At one time, the United States was the only country that controlled the
corrupt activities of its residents outside its borders. 60 Now, virtually all
27, 27. The non-members are Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile, and the Slovak Repub-
lic. See id.
56. See OECD Convention, supra note 9, art. 1, 1 1, 37 I.L.M. at 4. Stanley Arkin
criticizes the OECD Convention for its failure to include prohibitions on bribing politi-
cal parties, for not requiring amendment of tax laws so bribes are not deductible, and
for not imposing accounting provisions that would mitigate the ability of companies to
hide bribe payments. See Stanley S. Arkin, Bribery of Foreign Officials: Leveling the Play-
ing Field, N.Y. LJ., Feb. 19, 1998, at 3, 4.
57. See OECD Convention, supra note 9, art. 3, 2, 37 I.L.M. at 5. Germany's imple-
menting legislation provides a vigorous example of this requirement. See Gesetz zu dem
Obereinkommen fiber die Bestechung auslsndischer Amtstrhger im internationalen Ges-
chaftsverkehr [Act on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International
Business Transactions] (Internationalenbestechunggesetz), art. 2, sec. 1, v. 10.9.1998
(BGB1. II S.2327) (F.R.G.); WORKING GROUP ON BRIBERY IN INT'L BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS,
OECD, GERMANY: REvIEW OF IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CONVENTION AND 1997 RECOMMEN-
DATION 7 (2000) (comparing German law applied to domestic bribery and bribery of
foreign public officials and finding that Germany incorporates the transnational bribes
into the same domestic-bribery penalty scheme). Similarly, Norway implemented the
OECD Convention by adding a paragraph to its existing anti-bribery law: "The term
public servant in the first paragraph also includes foreign public servants and servants
of public international organisations." WORKING GROUP ON BRIBERY IN INT'L BUSINESS
TRANSACTIONS, OECD, NORWAY: REVIEW OF IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CONVENTION AND
1997 RECOMMENDATION 1 (2000) (citing NoR. PENAL CODE § 128 (1999)).
58. See OECD Convention, supra note 9, arts. 9 (dealing with mutual legal assis-
tance), 10 (extradition), 37 I.L.M. at 6; see also Dominic Bencivenga, Anti-Bribery Pact:
34 Nations Agree to Prosecute Business Payoffs, N.Y. Lj.,Jan. 15, 1998, at 5, 5 (characteriz-
ing these provisions as "critical").
59. See Anti-Corruption Unit, OECD, Implementation of OECD Convention on Com-
bating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials (last modified Sept. 22, 2000) <http://
wwv.oecd.org/daf/nocorruption/annex2.htm>. The United States amended the Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act to conform to the requirements of the OECD Convention. See
International Anti-Bribery and Fair Competition Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-366, 112
Stat. 3302.
60. See Joseph H. Guttentag, An Overview of International Tax Issues, 50 U. MIAMi L.
REv. 445, 446-47 (1996) ("United States remains the only country in the world that
criminalizes bribery of foreign government officials."). Technically, Sweden also had a
law that criminalized certain forms of transnational bribery by its citizens and residents.
See Michael Bogdan, International Trade and the New Swedish Provisions on Corruption,
27 AM.J. COMP. L. 665 passim (1979) (discussing SWED. PENAL CODE, SFS § 103 (1997)).
This law was weak almost to the point of nonexistence. The employer of the bribed
official had to report the bribe to the Swedish government with the intention that the
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major trading countries and providers of cross-border direct investment
regulate the actions of their residents and citizens in other countries.
Before discussing the two major types of implementing legislation, the rea-
sons for this change must be briefly examined.
B. Why Countries Are Adopting Anti-Bribery Laws
The United States enacted its anti-bribery law following a period of intense
political turmoil that included revelations of corruption at high levels.61
The corruption-related turmoil faced by the United States twenty-five years
ago, however, pales in comparison to that experienced by many European
and Latin American countries, as well as Japan in the last ten years.62
In 1998, Japanese officials initiated corruption investigations after rev-
elations that Recruit Company, a publisher of popular magazines for job
seekers, had sold shares of a subsidiary to government officials shortly
before the subsidiary went public.63 In 1992, the revelation that political
"godfather" Kanemaru Shin purchased Y3.4 billion worth of "discount
bonds" using political donations added a great deal of impetus to the inves-
tigations because Shin led the Liberal Democratic Party, which had gov-
erned Japan for thirty-eight years.64 Ultimately, Japan voted the Liberal
Democratic Party out of power, ended the practice of representing a con-
stituency with multiple seats, and reapportioned the seats in the Diet.65
In Italy, the mani polite-"clean hands"-investigation has changed
Italy's perception of itself.66 Over three thousand government officials
have been investigated, revealing a system of bribery that not only ties high-
level officials to large businesses, but also reaches into every level and
department of the Italian government.67 As did Japan, Italy not only voted
Swedish government prosecute the Swedish bribe-payer. See id. at 673. Also, the law
only zpplied to bribes paid to public officials in countries that prohibited its residents
from bribing Swedish officials-at the time, only the United States. See David R. Slade,
Comment, Foreign Corrupt Payments: Enforcing a Multilateral Agreement, 22 HAnv. Ir'L
LJ. 117, 122 n.22 (1981) (noting that the laws of the foreign country "must be perfectly
reciprocal" with Sweden's law).
61. See Beverley Earle, Bribery and Corruption in Eastern Europe, the Baltic States, and
the Commonwealth of Independent States: What Is To Be Done?, 33 CoRNELL INT'L LJ. 483
(2000) (sketching briefly the history behind the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act); Alejan-
dro Posadas, Combating Corruption Under International Law, 10 DuKEJ. COMP. & INT'L
L. 345, 348-59 (2000) (discussing in detail the conditions that led to the enactment of
the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act).
62. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 40, at 117 (statement of Guy de Vel, Director of
Legal Affairs of the Council of Europe) ("In the 1990's, countries in all parts of Europe
and the world were shaken by huge corruption scandals.").
63. See Fakutsa Masumi, Political Reform's Path of No Return, 41 JAPAN Q., July-Sept.
1994, at 254, 255 (describing the investigation).
64. See id. at 255-56.
65. See id. at 256-57.
66. See Daniel Williams, Italian Scandals Spread from Politics to Academia: Investiga-
tors Focus on Universities and Public Bureaucracy in Ongoing War on Corruption, WASH.
Post, Nov. 18, 1995, at A24 ("The scandals seem to be leading to a kind of national
nervous breakdown.... Exposure is translating into paralysis.").
67. See generally Hilary Partridge, Can the Leopard Change its Spots? Sleaze in Italy,
48 PARiA ENTAMRY An'. 711 (1995) (describing the extent of Italian corruption).
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out the party in power, but also changed the structure of its government
and ended the practice of representing a constituency with multiple
seats.68
Other nations are not immune to corruption. In France and Great
Britain, judicial investigations have revealed a close relationship-usually
cemented through payment of bribes or large illegal contributions to politi-
cal parties-between executives of multinational businesses and high-level
French and British government officials.69 As this article is being written,
Germany is in the throes of a corruption scandal that has thrust Germans
into an identity crisis and has humiliated the architect of German
reunification.70
At the same time as Western Europe has suffered through debilitating
corruption scandals, it has gained access to a newly opened Central and
Eastern Europe. As the Swiss scholar Mark Pieth points out, "Suddenly
corruption abroad no longer happened on a remote continent, far away
from home."71 Not only was the degradation of vital markets more appar-
ent,72 but it also was difficult for Europeans to avoid a sense of responsibil-
ity for that degradation.73 The convergence of these many factors led to the
promulgation of the OECD Convention and the resultant implementing
legislation.74
The events in Latin America have been even more dramatic. Much of
the region has shed military rule and embraced open and democratic insti-
tutions. At the same time, corruption has annihilated civil institutions in
many countries in the region. Venezuela, which participants and observers
68. See Martin Clark, 'Post-Fascist' Italy, 66 POL. Q. 238, 238-40 (1995) (describing
the results of the investigation and stating that the "Italian parliamentary elections of
March 1994 marked, to all appearances, the collapse of the 'first republic', or at least of
nearly all the parties that had ruled Italy since 1945"). Multiple seat districts lead to
fiercer and more expensive elections and, thus, increased the temptation of corruption.
69. See Christophe Fay, Political Sleaze in France: Forms and Issues, 48 Pam~.LNArraY
Ait. 663 (1995); F.F. Ridley, Feet of Clay: Threat to the Temples of Democracy, 48 PALItA.
MENTARY AFi. 617 (1995); Trevor Smith, Political Sleaze in Britain: Causes, Concerns and
Cures, 48 PARLIAMENTARY AFF. 551 (1995).
70. See The End for Kohl's Heir-Apparent, ECONoMisT, Feb. 19, 2000, at 51, 51-52;
Matthew Karnitschni, Oh, What A Tangled Web, Bus. WK., Feb. 14, 2000, at 58, 58-59
(discussing the investigation and noting that the revelations "are rocking Germany's
political Establishment to its core" and that the "architect of German unification has
seen his legacy stained by revelations that he ran a secret slush fund").
71. Mark Pieth, International Efforts to Combat Corruption, in THE FORIGN CORRUPt
PRAcncEs AcT: How To COMPLY UNDER THE NEw AmENDmENTs AND ThE OECD CONVEN.
TION E-1, E-1 (American Bar Ass'n et al. eds., 1999).
72. See id. at E-1.
73. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 40, at 114 (statement of Prof. Mark Pieth, Univer-
sity of Basel, Switzerland) (noting that Europeans became cognizant of the degradation
of vital markets); Pieth, supra note 71, at E-1 ("Europeans had to realize that they them-
selves also were the actors and the theatre in the world of bribery.").
74. See Brademas & Heimann, supra note 29, at 17-18 (attributing the OECD Con-
vention's creation to a "convergence of several political and economic pressures").
Despite the posturing of some U.S. politicians, to attribute the OECD Convention to U.S.
pressure bespeaks little understanding of the degree of European assurance with respect
to the United States or the depth of the corruption scandals in Europe.
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credit with leading the Organization of American States to adopt an anti-
bribery treaty, has been particularly affected by corruption scandals, lead-
ing some to question whether civil society can be restored. Corruption
scandals have also severely affected Ecuador, Brazil, and Colombia.
The convergence of economic and political currents in these two
regions resulted in treaties that require signatories to criminalize transna-
tional bribery. These countries must enact legislation that conforms to the
treaties' terms. Two possible means of defining bribery are available for
use in implementing legislation.
C. Definitions of Bribery in Anti-Bribery Laws
The fact that bribery must be defined locally creates two options for coun-
tries adopting anti-bribery laws. They either can define a set of actions and
draw a line that their citizens and residents may not cross anywhere in the
world, or they can prohibit their citizens and residents from acting in ways
prohibited by the local laws for wherever the individual travels. Countries
have utilized both in domestic legislation criminalizing transnational brib-
ery. Both options have advantages, and both are permissible under inter-
national law.
1. Bright Line Rules
The United States' Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 75 exemplifies a law that
defines behavior and prohibits specified persons from engaging in that
behavior anyplace in the world. The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act prohib-
its U.S. citizens or residents, U.S. corporations and other U.S. business
entities, or any officer, director, employee, agent, or stockholder acting on
their behalf 76 from paying or promising to pay anything of value to any
foreign official or political party for the purpose of improperly influencing
an act, omission, or decision of that official that relates to obtaining or
retaining business or directing business to another person.77 Canadian
75. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-l(a), -2(a) (Supp. 1999).
76. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-l(a), -2(a). The statute refers to these specified entities as
"domestic concerns." See David A. Gantz, A Post-Uruguay Round Introduction to Interna-
tional Trade Law in the United States, 12 Apdz.J. INT'L & COMP. L. 1, 178 (1995) (explicat-
ing "domestic concerns").
77. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-l(a), -2(a). Numerous books and articles explicate the
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. See, e.g., DON ZARIN, DOING BusiNESS UNDER THE FOREIGN
CoRRupr PRAcCEs AcT (Practising Law Inst. ed., 1995 & Supp. 1999). There are three
affirmative defenses to this law. If the payment is a legitimate expense in promoting or
showing a product, it is not illegal; this exception would include, for example, paying for
an officiars flight to a trade show or providing demonstration units. See 15 U.S.C.
§ 78dd-1(c)(2). Payments made to facilitate nondiscretionary acts, such as processing a
form or releasing goods for shipment, are not illegal. See 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-l(b). "This
so-called 'grease payment' or 'facilitating payment' exception in effect permits U.S. com-
panies to make modest payments to low-ranking government officials, to speed up or
secure the performance of something that the party is already entitled to obtain." ZARIN,
supra, at 5-1. Finally, if the payment is "lawful under the written laws and regulations"
of the host country, it is not illegal under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. 15 U.S.C.
§ 78dd-1(c)(1); see ZARN, supra, at 5-9 (noting that the defense has never been used
because every country outlaws bribery). The author of this article has criticized the
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law draws a similar line, prohibiting the conferral of a benefit on a foreign
government official as consideration for the performance of an official act
or to induce the official to influence acts or decisions of the foreign state in
connection with obtaining or retaining business.78
These laws draw a bright line, beyond which persons subject to that
law may not go. While this bright line may not be subtle or nuanced
enough for some, it accrues at least two sets of advantages. One set per-
tains to the citizens and residents bound by the rule, and the other set
relates to the nature of corruption.
For the businesses bound by the rule, a bright line is easier to manage
final defense's language as unworkable because it seems to require an affirmative state-
ment in the host country's laws that the payment is legal, while most laws only state
what is illegal. See Philip M. Nichols, Regulating Transnational Bribery in Times of Global-
ization and Fragmentation, 24 YALEJ. INT'L L. 257, 287-88 (1999). That criticism carries
less weight when evaluating the value of drawing a bright line definition of bribery.
The effect of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act on U.S. business practices abroad is
difficult to quantify, yet virtually every party concerned believes that the Act has signifi-
candy shaped the behavior of U.S. companies. Comparing two different studies, one on
managers' attitudes and the other on managers' performance, might provide insight. In
a survey of 2219 business managers, published in 1988, slightly more than half
responded that bribing a foreign official was sometimes or always acceptable, as
opposed to never acceptable. SeeJustin G. Longenecker et al., The Ethical Issue of Inter-
national Bribery: A Study of Attitudes Among U.S. Business Professionals, 7 J. Bus. ETHics
341, 343 (1988) (noting 32.5% responding sometimes acceptable and 18.6% respond-
ing always acceptable). However, in a separate survey on business managers' attitudes
toward the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, only 4.1% responded that they had paid a
bribe. SeeJYon N. PRASAD, IMPACT OF THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRAcIcEs ACT Of 1977 ON
U.S. EXPORT 142 (1993) (remarking 15 out of 336 respondents admitted to paying
bribes).
Three possible arguments that the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act has had little effect
do not actually address the Act's effect. The fact that bribery still exists, see Steven R.
Salbu, Bribery in the Global Market: A Critical Analysis of the Foreign Corrupt Practices
Act, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 229, 236-38 (1997), tells little about the Act because the rest
of the world has not criminalized transnational bribery until now. The fact that the
United States scores near the middle of Transparency International's Bribe Payers Index,
see David Hess & Thomas W. Dunfee, Fighting Corruption: A Principled Approach: The C2
Principles (Combating Corruption), 33 CORNELL INT'L LJ. 593 (2000), tells little because
there is no control for the behavior of U.S. companies without the Act. The fact that U.S.
companies are still investigated, see Salbu, supra, at 236-38, tells very little because most
laws are violated to some degree. At the least, many U.S. companies are inhibited by the
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act from engaging in corrupt practices. See, e.g., PRASAD,
supra, at 121 (reporting 44.6% of business managers surveyed as responding that the
Act is a "very important" or "extremely important" factor affecting U.S. trade).
78. See Corruption of Foreign Public Officials Act, ch. 34, § 3(1), 1997-1998 S.C. 1,
2 (Can.).
Every person commits an offence who, in order to obtain or retain an advantage
in the course of business, directly or indirectly gives, offers or agrees to give or
offer a loan, reward, advantage or benefit of any kind to a foreign public official
or to any person for the benefit of a foreign public official
(a) as consideration for an act or omission by the official in connection with
the performance of the official's duties or functions; or
(b) to induce the foreign official to use his or her position to influence any
acts or decisions of the foreign state or public international organization for
which the official performs duties or functions.
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across a variety of cultures and legal regimes. 79 Companies simply draft
one set of rules and distribute them to all offices, from Albania to
Zimbabwe.80° Moreover, a bright line rule provides an excuse for compa-
nies not to comply with questionable requests. Companies operating
under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act report enjoying this advantage.81
In addition, these laws allow countries to express their repugnance for
specified behavior. 82 Some countries, for example, use bright line rules to
prohibit their citizens from engaging child prostitutes outside the country's
physical territory.83
The advantages related to the nature of corruption are more difficult to
quantify. First, a bright line rule can prevent the degradation of local prac-
tices by foreign businesspersons. Petty corruption-extremely corrosive on
its own84-could lead to endemic grand corruption if exacerbated by for-
Id.
79. See generally Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42
DuKE LJ. 557 (1992) (discussing the nature and benefit of rules).
80. See Brademas & Heimann, supra note 29, at 22 (predicting that companies oper-
ating under the new anti-bribery laws will adopt codes of conduct); Harvey L. Pitt &
Karl A. Groskaufmanis, Minimizing Corporate Civil and Criminal Liability: A Second Look
at Corporate Codes of Conduct, 78 GEO. LJ. 1559, 1582-87 (1990) (discussing the use of
corporate codes to facilitate compliance with laws criminalizing transnational bribery)
81. James Kinnear, former President and Chief Executive Officer of Texaco, argues
that the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act allows U.S. companies to behave more ethically
because it provides an unassailable justification for turning down bribe requests. See
James W. Kinnear, The Ethics of International Business: Foreign Policy and Economic Sanc-
tions, 61 VITAL SPEECHES 561, 562 (1995) ("In my experience the Foreign Corrupt Prac-
tices Act has not been a hindrance, but a help.").
82. The importance of the relationship between law and societal values cannot be
overemphasized. As Oliver Wendell Holmes noted, "The first requirement of a sound
body of law is, that it should correspond with the actual feelings and demands of the
community, whether right or wrong." O.W. HoLMEs, JR., THE COMMON LAW 41 (1881);
see Gerard Brennan, Law in Search of a Principle, 9 J. CoNTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 259,
259 (1993) ("If the law is at odds with the value of society, the law falls into disrepute
and loses the force it needs to ensure conformity with its precepts."); Robert S. Sum-
mers, On Identifying and Restructuring a General Legal Theory-Some Thoughts Prompted
by Professor Moore's Critique, 69 CORNELL L. REv. 1014, 1024 (1984) ("[M]ost forms of
law are inevitably dependent to some extent for their context and justification on social
facts and values external to law.").
83. See Paul Michell, Domestic Rights and International Responsibilities: Extradition
Under the Canadian Charter, 23 YALE J. INr'L L. 141, 220 n.371 (1998) (stating that
Canada amended its Criminal Code to prosecute Canadians for engaging child prosti-
tutes while abroad); Margaret A. Healy, Note, Prosecuting Child Sex Tourists at Haqne: Do
Laws in Sweden, Australia, and the United States Safeguard the Rights of Children as Man-
dated by International Law?, 18 FoRDHAm INT'L LJ. 1852, 1888-89 (1995) (noting that
Sweden, Australia, and the United States have laws that allow the prosecution of extra-
territorial sexual contact with minors). Two things make the comparison to extraterrito-
rial child prostitution laws particularly apt. First, lax local law enforcement allows
foreign actors to engage in conduct that is only nominally illegal in the host country. See
Healy, supra, at 1870-71. Second, eliminating sexual predation of children may require
international coordination, not a simple increase in local efforts. See RON O'GRADY, THE
CHILD AND THE ToumsT: THE STORY BEHIND THE ESCALATION OF CHILD PROSTITUTION IN
AsIA 129 (1992).
84. The World Bank notes:
A small side payment for a government service may seem a minor offense, but it
is not the only cost-corruption can have far-reaching externalities. Unchecked,
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eign money.85 Endemic corruption can begin with the degradation of even
a common, noncorrupt practice.8 6 Particularly in countries with weak
enforcement mechanisms, a bright line rule delineates conduct beyond
which actors may not go; foreign actors cannot degrade local practice.8 7
Second, a bright line law forms an important baseline for nonlegal con-
trols, such as corporate codes and industry standards.8 8 Third, the inter-
national regimes can serve as models for local anti-bribery laws.8 9
2. Local Law
The second type of law simply requires obeisance to local bribery laws.
Hungarian and Icelandic law provide examples of legislation requiring citi-
zens and residents to simply obey local bribery laws. Hungarian law pun-
ishes an actor who "gives or promises the favour so that the foreign official
person violates his official duty, exceeds his competence or otherwise
abuses his official position."90 Icelandic law prosecutes an act punishable
the creeping accumulation of seemingly minor infractions can slowly erode
political legitimacy to the point where even noncorrupt officials and members of
the public see little point in playing by the rules.
WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1997: THE STATE IN A CHANGING WORLD 102
(1997).
85. Of the enabling laws reviewed by the author, only the United States creates an
exception for petty corruption. Those persons who have endured the degradation of
petty corruption despise it. In a survey of seven hundred people in Kazakhstan, sixty-
six percent found that small bribes paid to traffic police were harmful to Kazakhstan.
See PHILIP M. NIcHOLs, INDIGENOUS PERCEPTIONS OF CORRUPTION IN KAZAKHSTAN 66 (Zick-
lin Center Working Paper No. 02-01-00, 2000) (describing the survey and its results).
Any attempt to differentiate between petty and grand corruption should be vigorously
opposed by those who wish to contain the spread of corruption and its ensuing damage.
86. See Cragg, supra note 25, at 650.
87. See Bernard Black & Reinier Kraakman, A Self-Enforcing Model of Corporate Law,
109 HAv. L. REV. 1911, 1934-37 (1996) (stating that a method of compensating for
weak enforcement mechanisms is with a combination of bright line rules and strong
sanctions).
88. See David Charny, Nonlegal Sanctions in Commercial Relationships, 104 HARv. L.
REv. 373, 426-27 (1990) (warning against legal sanctions as an initial recourse for con-
tract relationships because bright line rulings set a minimum level of enforcement for all
future cases).
89. Korean scholar Jong Bum Kim suggests that this might occur in Korea. SeeJong
Bum Kim, Korean Implementation of the OECD Bribery Convention: Implications for
Global Efforts to Fight Corruption, 17 UCLA PAc. BASIN LJ. 245, 264-74 (2000) (noting
that the Korean implementing legislation closely resembles the OECD Convention's lan-
guage and approving of the potential changes as "more powerful than [Korea's existing
law] against national bribery"). Interestingly, the author of this article found that a for-
eign investment code transplanted into Kazakhstan had a similar effect; local businesses
used the law to govern commercial relationships because it was better than existing local
law. See Philip M. Nichols, The Viability of Transplanted Law: Kazahhstani Reception of a
Transplanted Foreign Investment Code, 18 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 1235, 1255-70 (1997);
see also Alan Watson, Aspects of Reception of Law, 44 Am. J. COMP. L. 335 (1996) (dis-
cussing factors affecting the transplant of law between countries).
90. Bfinteto T6rv~nk6nyv [BTK.] [Penal Code] tit. VII, sec. 258/B(2) (Hung.)
(imposing higher penalties for violating local laws than the basic sanctions applied to
the conforming provisions for the OECD Convention). Interestingly, Hungarian law
also allows prosecution in Hungary of foreign officials who solicit or accept bribes. See
id. sec. 258/D.
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under Icelandic law "provided it was also punishable under the law of that
state."91 This type of law allows companies to engage in the full range of
host country practices without serious worry of prosecution.92 Although
no convincing argument has been articulated that a bright line rule, such
as the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, prohibits behavior considered legal in
a foreign country, such a construct could exist.93 If it did exist, companies
operating under that law could be disadvantaged in competition with local
companies. 94
II1. The Attack on Anti-Bribery Laws as Intrusive
Laws that prohibit bribery of foreign officials have been criticized for a
number of reasons. Since the United States' Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
was for many years the only active legislation banning transnational brib-
ery, much of the criticism focuses on the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.
This article deals only with one criticism: that these laws are unwarranted,
morally imperialistic intrusions into the values and ethics of other coun-
tries that endanger good relations and comity among nations.95
The characterization of anti-bribery laws as dangerously intrusive errs
in two important ways. First, no empirical evidence supports the conclu-
91. GENERAL PENAL CODE [GPC], Law No. 19/1940, sec. 5(2) (Ice.) (establishing a
framework for applying any section of Iceland's Penal Code).
92. See Nichols, supra note 77, at 288 (noting that a change to the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act would achieve this result).
93. No argument has addressed other examples of bright line legislation, probably
because these laws are relatively new.
94. It is unclear whether this disadvantage actually exists. See infra Part V (discuss-
ing the two-way nature of multiculturalism).
95. See House COMM. ON INT'L RELATIONS, 94TH CONG., THE AcTITiES OF AMERICAN
MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS ABROAD: HEARINGS BEFORE THE SUBCOMM. ON INT'L EcON.
POLICY OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON INT'L RELATIONS 24 (1975) (statement of Mark B. Feld-
man, Deputy Legal Adviser, State Department) ("It would be not only presumptuous but
counterproductive to seek to impose our specific standards in countries with differing
histories and cultures. Moreover, enforcement of such legislation ... would be widely
resented abroad."); HowARD L. WEISBERG & ERIC REICHENBERG, THE PRICE OF AMBIGUITY:
MoRE THAN THREE YEARS UNDER THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT 21-26 (1981) (stat-
ing that the United States is attempting to impose its moral values on other cultures);
Steven R. Salbu, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act as a Threat to Global Harmony, 20
MICH. J. Ir'NTL L. 419, 433 (1999) [hereinafter Salbu, Global Harmony] ("The FCPA and
other such extraterritorial legislation are unnecessarily harsh and intrusive treatments
for bribery."); Steven R. Salbu, Extraterritorial Restriction of Bribery: A Premature Evoca-
tion of the Normative Global Village, 24 YALE J. INT'L L. 223, 252 (1999) [hereinafter
Salbu, Premature Evocation] (describing moral imperialism as an "ineluctable reality" of
the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act); Salbu, supra note 77, at 279 n.323 ("[T]he FCPA's
macro-level invasiveness can be characterized as moral imperialism."); Geoffrey Gamble
& Theodore F. Killheffer, The Enemies of United States' Trade Competitiveness: A Lawyer's
Perspective, 6 DEL. LAw. No. 3, Winter 1988, at 7, 12; Charles Gustafson, Dean of the
International & Graduate Programs at Georgetown University Law Center, Moderator's
Introduction to Panel Three of the 1998 OAS Symposium (Oct. 16, 1998), in Sympo-
sium, Transcript: The Role of Legal Institutions in the Economic Development of the Ameri-
cas, 30 LAw & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 171, 197-98 (Supp. 1999) (stating that during the
Congressional hearings on the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, representatives of multina-
tional corporations warned that it might be perceived as moral imperialism).
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sion that anti-bribery laws seriously offend host countries. Second, using
anecdotal evidence of the extraterritorial application of antitrust laws is
unsound and misleading.
A. Empirical Evidence Does Not Support Claims of Intrusiveness
Those who oppose anti-bribery laws warn darkly that the anger generated
by such intrusion poses a threat to global harmony. These doomsayers
cast forward in time; they would do well to look back. The Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act has been in effect for over twenty years. Scores of investiga-
tions have proceeded pursuant to the Act, and sixteen cases involving a
dozen countries have been prosecuted. 96 In those twenty years, not one
meaningful diplomatic rift can be attributed to enforcement of the Act.
Moreover, the one empirical evaluation of government responses to the For-
eign Corrupt Practices Act undermines the assertion that the criminaliza-
tion of transnational bribery is intrusive. In a study of Middle East
governments, Katherine Gillespie found minimal negative reaction to the
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.97
An answer to the lack of empirical support might be that anger over
intrusion is not a historical fact, but instead a possible outcome.98 This
argument strains both credibility and logic. Setting aside the credibility of
a claim that one nation may go to war because foreign citizens are not
allowed to bribe its officials, the argument does not in fact comport with
the logic of international affairs. Political entities around the world deal
with one another on "multiple issues that are not arranged in a clear or
consistent hierarchy."99 Singling out one issue, and claiming that that one
issue will cause war, is inconsistent with the world as it actually
operates. 100
96. See William F. Pendergast, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: An Overview of Almost
Twenty Years of Foreign Bribery Prosecutions, 7 Irr'L Q. 187, 192-204 (1995) (summariz-
ing the prosecutions).
97. See Kate Gillespie, Middle East Response to the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act,
39 CAL. MGMT. REy. No. 4, Summer 1987, at 9, 28.
98. See Salbu, Global Harmony, supra note 95, at 443 (stating that the criminaliza-
tion of transnational bribery "has the potential to fuel backlash and create an atmos-
phere of conflict, acts of retributive terrorism, and even war" (emphasis added) (footnote
omitted)).
99. ROBERT 0. KEOHANE & JOSEPH S. NYE, POWER AND INTERDEPENDENCE: WORLD
POLITCS IN TRANSITON 25 (1977).
100. See MURRAY WEIDENBAUM, SMALL WARS, BIG DEFENSE: PAYING FOR THE MILITARY
AFER THE COLD WiAR 195 (1992) ("[I]t has become clear that decisions affecting war,
peace, and the host of in-between positions cannot be made in isolation from domestic
and international political, economic, and social factors."); Benedict Kingsbury, The
Concept of Compliance as a Function of Competing Conceptions of International Law, 19
MICH. J. INT'L L. 345, 356 (1998) (noting the importance of the concept of complex
interdependence); Larry Kramer, Return of the Renvoi, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 979, 1026
(1991) ("If states have numerous interrelated interests, tacit or express cooperation is
necessary on a wide range of issues.").
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B. Comparison to Other Types of Law is Inappropriate
The most extensive argument to date claiming that anti-bribery laws consti-
tute an extraterritorial intrusion that will be resented by host countries
appears in a recent issue of the Michigan Journal of International Law.10 1
The article represents the most thorough and carefully articulated argu-
ment of anti-bribery laws as international intrusion and, thus, merits both
respect and scrutiny. A close review of the argument, however, reveals an
undifferentiated reliance on authorities and, ultimately, finds little indict-
ment of anti-bribery laws.
The article relies on thirteen sources in its discussion of the dangers of
extraterritorial legislation. 10 2 Of those thirteen, none discuss anti-bribery
laws, and few support their own claims empirically. Three of the thirteen
sources are newspaper or magazine stories commenting on foreign resent-
ment of U.S. economic superiority.10 3 Setting aside the anecdotal nature
of these references, it is difficult to draw a connection between U.S. eco-
nomic strength and the intrusiveness of anti-bribery laws-laws that Bulga-
ria, the Czech Republic, Japan, Korea, Mexico, and the Slovak Republic,
among others, stand ready to apply to conduct that occurs outside their
borders.' 0 4
Of the ten scholarly sources (five of which are student notes), 10 5 seven
deal with extraterritorial application of U.S. antitrust law.10 6 Including
101. See Salbu, Global Harmony, supra note 95.
102. See id. at 433 n.76, 438 n.104, 440 nn.116-17, 441 n.125, 442 nn.128-29 & 131-
32, 443 nn.137-39 & 444 n.140.
103. See id. at 441 & nn.125-27 (citing Eric Alterman, We Are the World, NATION, Mar.
9, 1998, at 4 (discussing "resentment [ofl ... U.S.-directed demands that nations like
Indonesia and South Korea open up their societies to U.S.-style capitalism")), 442 &
nn.129 (citing David Ivanovich, To Canada, Free Trade Isn't Trouble-Free, Hous. CHRON.,
Nov. 7, 1997, at IC, 8C (discussing concern of a Canadian steel representative that
Canadian culture will be swallowed by the U.S. culture)); & 132-33 (citing Kawachi
Takashi, A New Backlash Against American Influence, JAPAN ECHO, Apr. 1998, at 44, 45
("Those who feel victimized by post-cold-war trends regard economic globalization as a
campaign to impose Western values .... ")).
104. See supra note 59 and accompanying text (listing countries that have enacted
anti-bribery laws that criminalize bribery of foreign government officials).
105. No general disrespect for notes is intended, but students generally do not have
the research budget or the time to conduct extensive empirical research. The author of
this article has vigorously defended student-driven scholarly work on other occasions.
See Phil Nichols, Note, A Student Defense of Student Edited Journals: In Response to Profes-
sor Roger Cramton, 1987 DuKE Lj. 1122.
106. See Salbu, Global Harmony, supra note 95, at 433 & n.76 (citing Penny Zagalis,
Note, Hartford Fire Insurance Company v. California: Reassessing the Application of the
McCarran-Ferguson Act to Foreign Reinsurers, 27 CoRNLn INr'L Lj. 241, 267 n.192
(1994) (discussing British legislation blocking U.S. antitrust laws)), 438 n.104 (citing
Barry E. Hawk, International Antitrust Policy and the 1982 Acts: The Continuing Need for
Reassessment, 51 FomRHuA L. Rev. 201, 237-39 (1982) (discussing reactions to extrater-
ritorial application of U.S. antitrust laws)), 440 nn.116-17 (citing Douglas Michael Ely,
Note, The Noerr-Pennington Doctrine and the Petitioning of Foreign Governments, 84
CoLuM. L. REv. 1343, 1357 & nn.71-72 (1984) (discussing reaction of foreign govern-
ments to being involved in U.S. antitrust litigation); Note, Extraterritorial Application of
the Export Administration Act of 1979 Under International and American Law, 81 MICH. L.
REv. 1308, 1318 n.58 (1983) (discussing blocking legislation aimed at extraterritorial
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one source mentioned as dealing with antitrust, the remaining sources dis-
cuss the imposition of U.S. labor standards on foreign companies, 10 7 the
prosecution of Canadian companies under the Helms-Burton Act, 10 8 and
export controls imposed by the United States on foreign companies for
security purposes. 10 9
Comparison of anti-bribery laws to these other extraterritorial laws is
wrong and misleading. The comparison is wrong because each law relies
on a different justification for extending jurisdiction. There are five
accepted principles for exerting jurisdiction: territoriality, nationality, pas-
sive personality, protective personality, and universality. 110 The applica-
tion of anti-bribery laws is based on nationality-which holds that a
country has jurisdiction over its citizens regardless whether they are
located within its borders."' Prohibiting citizens from hiring child prosti-
tutes while outside their home country is another example of a law based
on the nationality principle. 1 2 Use of the nationality principle elicits very
application of U.S. antitrust law)), 442 n.128 (citing Gary E. Dyal, Comment, The
Canada-United States Memorandum of Understanding Regarding Application of National
Antitrust Law: New Guidelines for Resolution of Multinational Antitrust Enforcement Dis-
putes, 6 Nw.J. INT'L L. & Bus. 1065, 1065 (1984-85) (discussing reaction to extraterrito-
rial application of U.S. antitrust law)), 443 & n.138 (citing Michael Goldsmith & Vicki
Rinne, Civil RICO, Foreign Defendants, and "ET", 73 MINN. L. REV. 1023, 1027 n.21
(1989) (discussing reaction to U.S. antitrust law)), 444 n.140 (citing Robert D. Shank,
Note, The Justice Department's Recent Antitrust Enforcement Policy: Toward a "Positive
Comity" Solution to International Competition Problems?, 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 155,
160 n.18 (1996) (stating that the United States is the "most aggressive nation" in pursu-
ing extraterritorial application of antitrust law)). It is interesting that four of these seven
sources date back to the early 1980s.
107. See id. at 443 nn.137 & 139 (citing Mark E. Zelek, Book Review, 14 CoMP. LAB.
LJ. 514, 516-17 (1993) (discussing reaction to imposition of U.S. labor standards on
non-U.S. companies); James M. Zimmerman, International Dimensions of US Fair
Employment Laws: Protection or Interference?, 131 INT'L LABOUR REv. 217, 230 (1992)
(discussing U.S. labor laws)).
108. See id. at 442 & n.131 (citing Peter L. Fitzgerald, Pierre Goes Online: Blacklisting
and Secondary Boycotts in U.S. Trade Policy, 31 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1, 60-62 (1998)
(discussing blacklisting of Canadian companies under the Helms-Burton Act)). The
Helms-Burton Act, Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996,
Pub. L. No. 104-114, 110 Stat. 785, prohibits companies that have used certain assets in
Cuba from doing business in the United States; the law clearly violates several interna-
tional obligations of the United States. See generally Luisette Gierbolini, The Helms-Bur-
ton Act: Inconsistency with International Law and Irrationality at Their Maximum, 6 J.
TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'Y 289, 313-15 (1997) (discussing violations). The United States
and European Union have entered into an agreement that mitigates the impact of the
Helms-Burton Act. See Stefaan Smis & Kim Van der Borght, The EU-U.S. Compromise on
the Helms-Burton and D'Amato Acts, 93 Am. J. INr'L L. 227, 228 (1999) (discussing the
agreement).
109. See Salbu, Global Harmony, supra note 95, at 443 n.138 (citing Goldsmith &
Rinne, supra note 106, at 1027 nn.19-20 (discussing concerns of companies with respect
to U.S. export control laws)).
110. See OSCAR SCHACHTER, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 250-73
(1991) (discussing various types of jurisdiction); Kenneth C. Randall, Universal Jurisdic-
tion Under International Law, 66 TEx. L. REV. 785, 787-88 (1988) (same).
111. See IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAw 303 (3d ed. 1979)
(discussing the nationality principle); SCHACHTER, supra note 110, at 254 (same).
112. See supra note 83 and accompanying text (discussing laws).
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little international reaction;" 3 few are concerned, for example, that a citi-
zen of Singapore cannot defraud a fellow citizen while across the strait in
Malaysia or that a French citizen cannot reveal state secrets while across
the channel in Britain.
In contrast, extraterritorial application of antitrust law is not based on
any of the traditional principles; it is based instead on the effects princi-
plen1 4-which holds that a country may extend jurisdiction over acts that
occur outside its borders, but are intended to have a significant negative
effect within its borders." 5 The effects principle, unlike the nationality
principle, is very controversial.' 1 6 Indeed, it is not difficult to identify the
source of anger and possible 1 7 feeling of intrusion generated by the anti-
trust laws, labor laws, export control laws, and Helms-Burton: they encom-
pass controls on the behavior of non-citizens and non-residents while they
are outside the territory of the controlling country. Taking the earlier
examples, it would raise greater concern if a citizen of Singapore with no
113. See BRowN¢iE, supra note 111, at 303 (noting acceptance of the nationality prin-
ciple as a means of asserting jurisdiction); Lea Brilmayer & Charles Norchi, Federal
Extraterritoriality and Fifth Amendment Due Process, 105 Hl-v. L. Rav. 1217, 1241
(1992) ("It is also fairly well established that a state may regulate its residents, even
when they are acting outside of the state."); Gerald L. Neuman, Whose Constitution?, 100
YALE LJ. 909, 965-70 (1991) (detailing the U.S. Supreme Court's approval of the nation-
ality principle); Stephan Wilske & Teresa Schiller, International Jurisdiction in Cyber-
space: Which States May Regulate the Internet?, 50 FED. COMM. LJ. 117, 131 (1997)
(noting that the use of the nationality principle is "noncontroversial"). Furthermore,
international and domestic tribunals have applied and upheld the nationality principle.
See, e.g., S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk), 1927 P.C.IJ. (ser. A) No. 10, at 18-24 (Sept. 7) (apply-
ing the nationality principle); In re Di Lisi, 7 Ann. Dig. 193 (Italy Cass. 1934) (affirming
conviction of Italian national for acts committed outside of Italy and basing jurisdiction
on the nationality principle); X v. Public Prosecutor, 19 I.L.R. 226 (Neth. Hof 1952)
(convicting Dutch national for acts committed outside of the Netherlands and basing
jurisdiction on the nationality principle); United States v. Thomas, 893 F.2d 1066,
1068-69 (9th Cir. 1990) (approving extension of jurisdiction to acts outside of the
United States based on nationality principle). In short, the validity under international
law of extraterritorial anti-bribery laws applied to domestic citizens while abroad is
beyond question.
114. SeeJoel Davidow, Extraterritorial Application of U.S. Antitrust Law in a Changing
World, 8 LAvw & PoL'Y INf'L Bus. 895, 903-08 (1976) (discussing the application of the
effects test to the extraterritorial use of antitrust law); Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Labor
and the Global Economy: Four Approaches to Transnational Labor Regulation, 16 MICH. J.
Ir'L L. 987, 1013 (1995) (noting that the extraterritorial application of antitrust law is
based on the effects test).
115. See Wilske & Schiller, supra note 113, at 132-33 (describing the effects test).
116. See id. at 132.
117. One must be careful about the conclusions drawn by the article under scrutiny.
The article, for example, characterizes one citation as "noting 'unmitigated hostility' to
U.S. law applied abroad," Salbu, Global Harmony, supra note 95, at 433 n.76, when in
fact the cited author simply reports a Federal District Court's supposition that Britain
holds "unmitigated hostility" toward U.S. antitrust law, Zagalis, supra note 106, at 267
n.192. Similarly, the article under scrutiny states that a book review "not[es] 'the impo-
sition of extraterritorial standards may be viewed by foreign countries as uninvited inter-
ference,' which historically has 'resulted in retaliation and embarrassing diplomatic
protest in the foreign public policy arena,'" Salbu, Global Harmony, supra note 95, at 443
n.137, when in fact the book review refers to frustration with the uneven application of
U.S. labor standards outside the United States, Zelek, supra note 107, at 517.
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relationship to Denmark could not defraud a fellow citizen because of Dan-
ish law or if a French citizen with no relationship to Bolivia could not
reveal state secrets because the Bolivian government forbids such conduct.
Comparison of antitrust and anti-bribery laws, therefore, constitutes a
false analogy. Arguing that extraterritorial application of antitrust laws
engenders anger and therefore the enforcement of anti-bribery laws will
also engender anger makes no more sense than arguing that because a per-
son does not like apples she will not like oranges. Antitrust laws and anti-
bribery laws are fundamentally different.
This analysis is not meant as an indictment of the research or scholar-
ship of the particular article's author. Indeed, at the most general level it
can be said that "[plotential host country resentment of extraterritiorially
applied legislation is hardly debatable."'118 At a more specific level, how-
ever, it is entirely debatable whether the control of specific behavior outside
a country's borders will be considered intrusive. While the argument that
anti-bribery laws are intrusive has been made, the case supporting that pro-
position has not. Attempts to support the proposition through reference to
entirely different types of laws must be rejected because they bring few real
insights to the debate.
IV. Extraterritorial Regulation Actually is Unremarkable
The prior discussion of the nationality principle for extraterritorial juris-
diction suggests that regulation of citizens outside a country's borders
might occur on a regular basis. This is in fact the case; the extraterritorial
regulation of business behavior is unremarkable both in a legal and an
ethical sense.
A. Extraterritorial Regulation is Unremarkable from a Legal Perspective
The validity of extraterritorial laws regulating domestic businesses has
been discussed elsewhere; 119 there is little question that these laws are
appropriate under international law.120 Those who characterize the
criminalization of transnational bribery as intrusive, however, treat anti-
bribery laws as unique. This treatment belies reality-much business con-
duct is regulated beyond a country's border. Regulations concerning mat-
ters such as accounting requirements, exchange controls, securities
regulations, banking regulations, anti-boycott laws, export controls,
secrecy laws, social welfare laws, business form, corporate governance, and
taxes apply to a business with little regard for political borders. 12 1 Most,
118. Salbu, Global Harmony, supra note 95, at 433.
119. See, e.g., Nichols, supra note 77, at 290-92; Nichols, supra note 17, at 367-70.
120. See supra notes 111-13 and accompanying text.
121. See Daniela Levarda, Note, A Comparative Study of U.S. and British Approaches to
Discovery Conflicts: Achieving a Uniform System of Extraterritorial Discovery, 18 FORD-
HAM I N' LJ. 1340, 1381 (1995) (discussing extraterritorial discovery); Matthew W.
Sawchak, Note, The Department of Defense's Role in Free-World Export Licensing Under
the Export Administration Act, 1988 DuKE LJ. 785, 807 (discussing extraterritorial appli-
cation of export control laws); Seymour J. Rubin, Book Review, 78 Am. J. INT'L L. 700,
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although not all, of these regulations are entirely uncontroversial.1 22 It
would be disingenuous of those who focus on bribery to suggest that other
regulated extraterritorial-business behaviors are less connected to a cul-
ture; these practices, and business in general, are deeply intertwined with
culture. 123
Judicial inquiry into citizens' activities abroad is also commonplace. It
would be impossible to list all the cases involving judicial scrutiny of citi-
zens' acts while abroad; any first year law student, however, can point to
cases such as Batsakis v. Demotsis.' 2 4 Indeed, from their existence to their
enforcement, there simply is nothing remarkable about anti-bribery laws.
B. Anti-Bribery Laws are Unremarkable from an Ethical Perspective
Giving effect to norms generated by communities other than nations-com-
munities such as international organizations or transnational business
partnerships-is also unremarkable. Integrative social contracts theory
provides special insights into community-generated norms. As explicated
by Thomas Donaldson and Thomas Dunfee, integrative social contracts
theory is a widely explored analytical tool in the field of business ethics.1 2 5
Integrative social contracts theory is based on the tradition of social con-
700-03 (1984) (discussing the various laws affecting multinational businesses); Martin
Flumenbaum & Brad S. Karp, Second Circuit Review: Trademark Infringement; Attorney
Work-Product, N.Y. LJ., Mar. 25, 1998, at 3, 4 ("With the advent of the Internet and with
companies broadly thrusting their '[trademarks]' into cyberspace, Lanham Act extrater-
ritorial jurisdiction will be required to adapt.").
122. The anti-boycott laws, for example, which require U.S. companies to ignore the
Arab boycott of Israel and require European companies to ignore the U.S. boycott of
Cuba, are somewhat controversial; those controversies are not necessarily centered on
intrusiveness.
123. See Al Bhimani, Modern Cost Management: Putting the Organization Before the
Technique, 36 INT'LJ. PRODUCTION ECON. 29, 29, 31-34 (1994) (noting numerous studies
that indicate that accounting practices are shaped by broad "behavioural, political, insti-
tutional and socio-cultural factors"); Fligstein, supra note 6, at 656 (stating that markets
and culture are inseparable); W. Richard Scott, The Organization of Environments: Net-
work, Cultural, and Historical Elements, in JOHN W. MEYER & W. RICHARD SCOTT, ORGANI-
ZATIONAL ENVIRONMENTS: RITUAL AND RA-nONALITY 155, 155-75 (1983) (discussing
business as a cultural artifact).
124. 226 S.W.2d 673 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949) (upholding an agreement executed by a
U.S. citizen while in Greece).
125. See THOMAS DONALDSON & THOMAs DuNFEE, TIES THAT BIND: A SocIAL CONTRACTS
APPROACH TO BUSINESS ETHICS 18-19 (1999); see also Jeffrey Nesteruk, The Moral Dynam-
ics of Law in Business, 34 Am. Bus. LJ. 133, 134-35 (1996) ("Virtue ethics and social
contract theory... are increasingly influencing our understanding of ethical issues in
business."); Robert Phillips, Stakeholder Theory, Social Contracts, and A Principle of
Fairness 1 (1997) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) ("Prominent among
the myriad proposed models of business ethics are stakeholder theory and social con-
tract theory. The latter has, in fact, been suggested as a normative grounding for the
former."). For a clear explanation of integrative social contracts theory, see DAVID J.
FRITZSCHE, BUSINESS ETHICS: A GLOBAL AND MANAGERIAL PERSPECTIVE 43-47 (1997);
Timothy L. Fort, Goldilocks and Business Ethics: A Paradigm That Fits "Just Right", 23 J.
CORP. L. 245, 252-56 (1998). For an interesting application of integrative social con-
tracts theory to the legal infrastructure of an emerging economy, see Sheila M. Puffer &
Daniel J. McCarthy, Business Ethics in a Transforming Economy: Applying the Integrative
Social Contracts Theory to Russia, 18 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 1281 (1997).
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tract theorists, such as Locke and Rousseau, 126 but radically extends those
theories by integrating two distinct types of social contracts. 12 7
The first type is a hypothetical macrosocial contract among all mem-
bers of society that contains all the economic rules to which members
would agree. 12 8 Obviously, there will not be a great number of rules; mem-
bers would agree, therefore, that within the hypothetical macrosocial con-
tract exists a moral free space. Inside that moral free space, economic
communities are free to enter into the second type of social contract-
explicit contracts that provide more detailed rules concerning ethical
behavior in economic life. 129 These microsocial contracts are bounded
only by hypernorms-"principles so fundamental to human existence that
they serve as a guide in evaluating lower level moral norms"130 -and a
requirement that individual members consent to the contract. 13 1
The concept of economic communities is critical to a theory that
"allows for moral diversity among various cultures while maintaining cer-
tain universal norms."132 Dunfee defines communities as "all coherent
groupings of people capable of generating ethical norms ... includ[ing] a
corporation, a department or other sub-group within a corporation, a
social club, an industry association, a faculty senate, a church or syna-
126. See Michael Keeley, Continuing the Social Contract Tradition, 5 Bus. ETHics Q.
241, 244-46 (1995) (stating that Donaldson and Dunfee's work extends the work of the
Sophists and Locke to modern organizations); see also Alan Strudler, Moral Complexity
in the Law of Nondisclosure, 45 UCLA L. REv. 337, 363 n.86 (1997) (stating that integra-
tive social contracts theory melds communitarian and social contract ideas).
127. See Thomas Donaldson & Thomas W. Dunfee, Toward a Unified Conception of
Business Ethics: Integrative Social Contracts Theory, 19 AcAD. MGMT. REV. 252, 254 (1994)
(explaining the appellation).
128. See Thomas Donaldson & Thomas W. Dunfee, Integrative Social Contracts The-
ory: A Communitarian Conception of Economic Ethics, 11 EcoN. & PHIL. 85, 93 (1995)
(explaining the hypothetical macrosocial contract).
129. See Donaldson & Dunfee, supra note 128, at 94-95 (discussing microsocial con-
tracts); Donaldson & Dunfee, supra note 127, at 260-62 (discussing moral free space);
David Hess, Social Reporting: A Reflexive Law Approach to Corporate Social Responsive-
ness, 25 J. CoRP. L. 41, 56 (1999) ("Due to the artificial nature of business, [members of
the business community] are free to shape the 'rules' of the economic game.").
130. Donaldson & Dunfee, supra note 127, at 265; see also Thomas W. Dunfee, The
Role of Ethics in International Business, in BusiNEss ETHics: JAPAN AND THE GLOBAL ECON.
oMy 63, 69 (Thomas W. Dunfee & Yukimasa Nagayasu eds., 1993) ("Hypernorms are
defined as norms so fundamental to human existence that they will be reflected in a
convergence of religious, political and philosophical thought. Hypernorms thus
represent core or fundamental values common to many cultures."). The proscription of
bribery is considered a hypernorm. See Thomas W. Dunfee et al., Social Contracts and
Marketing Ethics, 63 J. MARKEING, July 1999, at 14, 24 (discussing the universal con-
demnation of bribery).
131. See Donaldson & Dunfee, supra note 128, at 98. Consent can be indicated by,
among other things, not taking advantage of an opportunity to exit. See id. at 99-100.
132. FRITZSCHE, supra note 125, at 43. Interestingly, Donaldson and Dunfee use the
OECD Convention, see supra notes 9, 55-59 and accompanying text, as an example of a
microsocial contract among a "broader and more global" community that, therefore,
would have more weight than the norms of individual OECD members. DONALDSON &
DUNFEE, supra note 125, at 187.
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gogue, a city government, an association of trial lawyers and so on."133
Two aspects of communities are critical. First, communities constitute
themselves voluntarily.1 34 Community must be defined flexibly, x35 but
business relationships are explicitly recognized as communities.136 Sec-
ond, communities are not defined or limited by political or cultural bor-
ders. In other words, countries have no claim to superiority over
transnational communities with respect to the generation of norms.
Transnational communities may in fact have a claim to superiority
over countries. For the norms generated by a community to be considered
authentic, a majority of the community must consent to those norms and
the members of the community must have the right to exit the commu-
nity.137 Transnational business relationships, almost by definition,
embody these qualities. Not all countries, on the other hand, satisfy these
requirements. 138
133. Dunfee, supra note 130, at 68 ("Thus defined, communities are groups that
determine their own membership and apply their own preferred forms of rationality.").
134. See Donaldson & Dunfee, supra note 127, at 273 (defining "community as a self-
defined, self-circumscribed group of people who interact in the context of shared tasks, values
or goals").
135. See DONALDSON & DuN-EE, supra note 125, at 98 ("This open-ended definition is
intended to allow for a great variety in the way in which people form relationships capa-
ble of generating authentic ethical norms.").
136. See id. at 39 (noting that communities "evolve out of the marketplace as individu-
als interact and form various types of relationships"), 41 (noting that "a community can
derive from an express contractual commitment"), 101 (noting that communities can
form "around certain types of recurring transactions").
137. See Donaldson & Dunfee, supra note 127, at 262-63 (describing the authenticity
of norms).
138. Indeed, an interesting aspect of the position against anti-bribery laws is that it
argues for cultural sensitivity, while speaking in terms of nations. Compare Salbu,
Global Harmony, supra note 95, at 447 (noting the cultural diversity of the world) with
Salbu, Premature Evocation, supra note 95, at 231 (stating that nations are the primary
unit of analysis). However, states rarely coincide with or always represent one culture.
The military government of Burma, which forcibly suppresses a democratic government
voted for by eighty percent of the electorate, can hardly be said to represent Burmese
culture. See Janelle M. DUller, Constitutional Reform in a Repressive State: The Case of
Burma, 33 AsLAN Suav. 393, 393-96 (1993) (discussing Burma's history). The People's
Republic of China, where Uighur and Tibetan cultures are being destroyed by Han Chi-
nese, may not constitute a viable representative of the cultural values for all the commu-
nities in China. See Azat Akimbek, The Making of a Nationalist, INDEX ON CENSORSHIP No.
2, Mar. 1998, at 173, 173-74 (discussing conditions in Uighurstan); Guangqiu Xu, The
United States and the Tibet Issue, 37 AsIAN SuRv. 1062, 1062 (1997) (discussing condi-
tions in Tibet and noting that "[tihe Tibetans have a distinct religion, language, and
culture and have never been assimilated culturally by the Han"). The national borders in
Central Asia were drawn by Stalin for political expediency and do not reflect the under-
lying cultures. See Stephen Blank, Soviet Reconquest of Central Asia, in CENTRAL AsiA Irs
STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE AND FuTuRE PROSPEcrs 39, 55 (Hafeez Malik ed., 1994) (noting
that the borders drawn by Stalin did not make cultural sense); Paul A. Goble, Stalin
Draws the Borders, CENr. AsIA MONITOR No. 2, 1995, at 12, 13-14 (stating that Stalin
drew the borders in Central Asia to maintain his power). Indeed, the concept of nations
is a Western idea that is not always relevant to Eastern cultures. See Victor Ya.
Porkhomovsky, Historical Origins of Interethnic Conflicts in Central Asia and Transcauca-
sia, in CENTRAL AsIA AND TRANscAucAsIA: ETHNicry AND CoNFLIcr 1, 16 (Vitaly V.
Naumkin ed., 1994) (noting that "the 'eastern way' of formation of the state system
differs from the European one").
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V. Multiculturalism is a Two-Way Street
The cultural sensitivity that anti-bribery laws purportedly violate
originates from a particularly simplistic image of cultural interaction. This
view can be illustrated by the old adage: "When in Rome, do as the Romans
do." Such a simplistic view is neither necessary nor useful when evaluat-
ing the intrusiveness of anti-bribery laws. A more refined version is more
useful: "When in Rome, do as much of what the Romans do as you can." It
would be ludicrous, for example, to declare cultural insensitivity if a
Hebrew visiting ancient Rome refused to worship the pantheon of Roman
gods 13 9 or if a Zoroastrian from Persia refused to participate in a bacchana-
lian orgy. 140 Values, mores, strictures, and rules travel with a person.'
4 1
To demand that a person give up his or her values and rules at a political
border is just as culturally insensitive as demanding that a host country
change its norms. 14
2
Politeness and sensitivity are appropriate and make good business
sense.' 43 Cultural fluency, however, is more important than cultural sensi-
tivity in a business context. 144 Cultural fluency is the ability to encode and
139. See Karn-I HOPKINS, A WORLD FULL OF GODS: PAGANS, JEws AND CHRISTINS IN THE
ROMAN EMPIRE 7-45 (1999) (discussing the situation of monotheistic Jews in ancient
Rome).
140. Compare P.G. Walsh, Making a Drama Out of a Crisis: Livy on the Bacchanalia, 43
GREECE & ROME 188, 188-89 (1996) (describing the orgy on which a play was based)
with S.A. Nigosian, Zoroastrian Perception of Ascetic Culture, 34J. ASIAN & Ai'. STUD. 4,
7-8 (1999) (describing Zoroastrian purity).
141. The continued consumption of home country food provides a striking example.
See Sudha Raj et al., Dietary Habits of Asian Indians in Relation to Length of Residence in
the United States, 99 J. Am. DIErEIc ASS'N 1106 (1999) (finding that even after ten years
in the United States, Asian Indians will continue to eat many traditional Indian foods).
Meals are a critical aspect of culture. See generally FooD AND CULTURE: A READER (Carole
Counihan & Penny Van Esterik eds., 1997).
142. The field of social work, whose practitioners frequently interact with people
from different cultures, explicitly recognizes this aspect of cultural sensitivity. See Mir-
iam Potocky, Multicultural Social Work in the United States: A Review and Critique, 40
INT'L Soc. WORK 315, 324-25 (1997) (advocating cultural sensitivity when working with
persons from other cultures). Scholars in the field of social work recognize that the
definitions and indicia of cultural sensitivity are not yet fully developed. See Charles R.
Ridley et al., Cultural Sensitivity in Multicultural Counseling: A Perceptual Schema Model,
41 J. COUNSELING PSYCHOL. 125, 125 (1994) (critically reviewing multicultural counsel-
ing literature and finding four limitations to conceptualizing cultural sensitivity: "defini-
tional variance, inadequate descriptions of [indicators of cultural sensitivity], lack of
theoretical grounding, and limitations in measurement and research designs"). These
limitations arguably exist in the legal literature as well.
143. Every transnational businessperson probably has an apocryphal story of a deal
lost or nearly lost due to some social blunder, and numerous sources assist businesses-
and courts-in learning the social rules of different countries. See, e.g., TERu MomusoN
ET AL., KIss, Bow, OR SHAKE HANDS: How TO Do BUSINESS IN SIXM COUNTRIES (1994);
PARKER PEN Co., Do's AND TABOOS AROUND THE WORLD (Roger E. Axtell ed., 3d ed. 1993);
Getting Through Customs, Omnibus (visited Oct. 1, 2000) <http://
www.getcustoms.com/omnibus.html>. More untold stories probably exist, however, of
deals successfully concluded even though one party found the other odd or rude. In
daily life, the boorish behavior of others is usually shrugged off.
144. See Collin Randlesome & Andrew Myers, Cultural Fluency: Results from a UK and
Irish Survey, Bus. COMM. Q. No. 3, Sept. 1997, at 9, 34 (finding cultural fluency critical
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decode exchanges in the same way as members of a given culture. 145 With
respect to intercultural communication, it is more important to understand
the meaning assigned to and taken from artifacts than to merely imitate the
actions of the host culture's members.
The height of cultural insensitivity would be to require those who
interact with other cultures to shed all values of their own culture. An
observant Jew visiting Bali does not have to eat pork. A Muslim wearer of
the veil who visits New York does not have to travel bare-faced. A business-
person whose home country has criminalized transnational bribery does
not have to pay a bribe. At the very edges, 146 some conduct that is legal
and culturally acceptable in the host country will be prohibited by the
home country. Sensitivity to these prohibitions is the essence, rather than
a denial, of multiculturalism.
Conclusion
Anti-bribery laws that criminalize the payment of bribes to foreign govern-
ment officials are an established component of the multinational arsenal to
combat transnational bribery. Although criticized by some as morally-
imperialistic and dangerous intrusions into the affairs of other nations,
those criticisms of the laws are unfounded. Anti-bribery laws are legally
and ethically unremarkable, and no evidence supports a claim they are
considered intrusive or generate hostility. Anti-bribery laws, therefore,
should continue to be considered available for multinational and unilateral
efforts to combat corruption.
to success in transnational ventures and stating that an emphasis on cultural sensitivity
"obscure[s] the underlying issues").
145. See Linda Beamer, Learning Intercultural Competence, 29 J. Bus. COMM. 285
(1992) (describing meanings that "match" the meanings originating from the communi-
cator's repository or database). Colin Randlesome and Andrew Myers consider the abil-
ity to decode meaning the most important aspect of cultural fluency. See Coin
Randlesome & Andrew Myers, Cultural Fluency: The United Kingdom Versus Denmark,
Eua. Bus. J. No. 4, 1998, at 184, 185 (emphasizing the decoding aspect of Beamer's
definition).
146. It must be remembered that this discussion involves the edges of a global under-
standing on corruption. In that context, it is interesting to note the selectivity with
which opponents of anti-bribery laws emphasize the edges of a universal norm. Torture
and unjustified murder have been offered by opponents of anti-bribery laws as universal
norms capable of universal enforcement, see Salbu, Premature Evocation, supra note 95,
at 233 n.59 (offering torture as an example); Salbu, Global Harmony, supra note 95, at
439 & n.111 (murder), although the precise boundaries of each across different cultures
is not fixed. The European Court of Human Rights, for example, upheld the United
Kingdom's refusal to extradite a German national to the United States on the grounds
that forcing the defendant to face the death penalty would constitute a cruel violation of
human rights, see Soering, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 44-45 (1989), whereas the U.S.
Supreme Court has ruled that the death penalty does not constitute cruel or unusual
punishment, see Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 168-69 (1976).

